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For over fifty years, antagonistic rela-
tions between the United States and Cuba
yielded little beyond a rigid impasse in for-
mal communication channels. During the
Cold War period, the relationship included
a failed armed invasion of Cuba (popu-
larly known as the Bay of Pigs), escalated
tensions between the ideological poles of
the global “East” and “West” bringing the
world to the brink of nuclear disaster (the
Cuban missile crisis), and an intensifying
series of measures by the US government
to reverse the Cuban social and political
revolution in the name of national security
(ranging from economic sanctions to assas-
sination attempts). In the bipolar interna-
tional system dominating the second half of
the 20th century in which decision-makers
were largely operating under realist power-
politics assumptions, it is remarkable that
Cuba existed as a rebel small state in the
sphere of influence of a hegemonic power
on whose agenda the country ranked as a
supreme security threat. Proximity adds
another noteworthy dimension: Cuba is 90
miles away from Florida. What accounts
for Cuba’s prolonged “survival” with rela-
tively little impingement on the country’s
ability to self-determine its internal socio-
political and economic configuration? How
Cuba pulled o↵ the feat is worth noting
(Section II) to contextualize and contrast
Cuba’s present-day challenges in a changed
and changing international landscape.
2015 looks very di↵erent for Cuba
and Cuban-US relations. It is charac-
terized by an increased flexibility in the
United State’s diplomatic stance and an in-
creased willingness of the Cuban Commu-
nist Party (PCC) to amend the country’s
socio-economic architecture away from one
dominated by central planning and state-
ownership. Cuban President Raul Castro,
however, has made it clear that a major
overhaul of the country’s political system
won’t accompany the normalization of US-
Cuban relations. Shortly before 2014 drew
to an end, the president reiterated:
“We can’t pretend that by improv-
ing ties with the Unites States, Cuba
will renounce the ideas for which it
has fought for more than a century,
for which its people have shed a lot
of blood and have run the biggest of
risks.” (Mitchell, 2015)
In this context, Cuba is feeling its way
cautiously towards market-socialism. In
2010, Cuba’s trade union (the CTC) pub-
lished a statement in the PCC’s o cial
newspaper (the Granma) announcing a se-
ries of sweeping changes aimed at rais-
ing economic productivity. (Granma, 2010)
The statement repeated points made pre-
viously by Raul to the e↵ect that “over-
sized social spending” has to be reduced
and that “excessive subsidies” and “un-
warranted gratuities” had to be elimi-
nated. (Castro, 2010) To this end, the
PCC is introducing new - and expand-
ing its limited existing - legal categories
of domestic private entrepreneurial activ-
ity, increasing licenses for self-employment,
and simultaneously downsizing the state-
sector. (Pe´rez-Stable, 2010) The party is
also continuing to actively attract targeted
foreign direct investments in sectors in-
cluding agriculture, infrastructure, sugar,
nickel mining, and real estate development.
Cuban citizens are creatively exploiting the
new breathing room formally and infor-
mally allowed by the state. What will
the update to the economic model mean
for the socialist project? Can the social
gains of the revolution supporting com-
munity and personal development—from
universal housing, education, and health
care to accessible and vibrant artistic and
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recreational venues—be reconciled with el-
ements of market driven growth? This ar-
ticle will explicate this inevitable tension:
keeping intact the precincts of the revolu-
tion while opening the door to capitalist
forces driven by certain inherently oppos-
ing tendencies. If not well-managed, the
transition threatens the very social-ills that
the revolution has heretofore averted.
Cuban Survival
The revolution’s early success in resisting
U.S. encroachment hinged on mass mobi-
lization of Cuban nationalism. A deliber-
ate socialization process cultivated a rev-
olutionary consciousness loosely summa-
rized as a belief in one Cuba for all Cubans
by Cubans. The vision was instrumental
in legitimizing the regime internally. By
convincingly presenting itself as the polit-
ical force championing sovereignty and a
flat distribution of wealth, the Cuban state
derived its legitimacy at home through
an anti-systemic movement that challenged
a neoliberal logic for societal organiza-
tion. The resulting internal popular sup-
port helped mute US e↵orts to fan dis-
sident coals in the countries unyielding
attempts to light destabilizing counter-
revolutionary fires. Cuba’s relatively cohe-
sive internal commitment to revolutionary
principles was not only the founding ba-
sis of the PCC’s Cuba, but it conferred to
the country credibility that it was a pro-
moter of its espoused principles. As such,
the Cuban socialist model became recog-
nized as a viable and visionary one by
other states and movements in the inter-
national community involved in liberation
struggles against Western impingements on
sovereignty and self-determination. A gen-
uine collective revolutionary consciousness,
therefore, was also instrumental for gar-
nering external recognition. Cuba had a
clear global vision, and the vision was rec-
ognized as a competitive one in the interna-
tional order, and the recognition, in turn,
translated into material benefits indispens-
able to maintaining power. In Cuba’s case,
this meant preferential trade agreements
with Russia and full integration into the
Soviet trade orbit. The relationship se-
cured a market for Cuba’s primary ex-
port - sugar - at subsidized prices along
with subsidized inflows of Russian indus-
trial goods, foods, medicine, weapons, and
oil that Cuba could use domestically as well
as mark-up and resell on global markets
for profit. This economic integration di-
luted the strangulation e↵ect of U.S sanc-
tions that had proven crippling in coun-
tries like Nicaragua and Chile. It was pre-
cisely because Cuba was recognized as an
actor worth backing that a better-endowed
benefactor did, in fact, back it. The re-
sult was a Cuba able to secure enough
material wherewithal to deliver on its so-
cialist promise. This minimized the dis-
crepancy between the PCC’s revolution-
ary rhetoric and its ability to deliver – a
costly discrepancy that might have arisen
had the party not been able to finance the
social programs at the heart of the social-
ist project. What would happen when the
better-endowed benefactor was no longer
so well endowed?
In 1991, Gorbachev announced that the
Soviet Union would end the 4-5 billion dol-
lar annual subsidy to the Cuban economy
and withdraw troops and advisors from the
island. The dissolution of the Soviet Union
also meant the collapse of its sponsored
trading bloc. Cuba’s economic juggernaut
was severely injured virtually overnight: no
more preferential prices, no more delivery
of critical resources (oil, food, medicine),
and no more guaranteed markets for Cuban
sugar to finance domestic government ex-
penditures. During the period between
1990 and 1993, Cuba lost over 80 percent
of its foreign trade, and its GDP plum-
meted by 30 percent. (Mesa-Lago, 1998)
In an apparent e↵ort to capitalize on the
ensuing Cuban desperation, in hopes that
critical conditions might force the PCC
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into making political and economic conces-
sions, the U.S passed The Cuban Democ-
racy Act in 1992 and the Helms-Burton
Act in 1996. The acts intensified e↵orts
to isolate the Cuban economy and coax its
implosion by deterring the FDI Cuba was
desperately trying to attract and by cut-
ting into its remittance hard-currency rev-
enue. (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014) The
economic strangulation came with a ma-
nipulative peace o↵ering: sanctions would
be lifted if Cuba democratized.
Energy shortages and food shortages
became commonplace, along with malnu-
trition and the deterioration of infrastruc-
ture. Despite this, Cuba once again re-
sisted external dictates and reoriented to
adapt to the loss of Soviet subsidies and US
pressure. The struggles characterizing the
period combined with the PCC’s responses
to assuage them, however, have had reper-
cussions for the relationship between the
state and its citizens: Cubans began los-
ing faith in the ability of the state to meet
their needs and the state began signaling
that perhaps, it too, was losing faith in its
ability to micromanage society sustainably
and e↵ectively. While Cuba “survived”
what became dubbed the “special period,”
it was not without trauma to the Cuban
psyche and the country’s revolutionary so-
cialist framework, validating inklings that
the Cuban model was in need of update.
Before the special period, the Fidel so-
lution to low economic productivity tended
towards “mobilization politics” that rallied
the people behind moral incentives and the
righteousness of the revolution (rectifica-
tion campaign in the late 80s, Committees
for the Defense of the Revolution, youth
armies to wage a “battle of ideas” in the
early 90s). (Pe´rez-Stable, 1993) This time,
nationalistic appeals to “la patria” (the fa-
therland) to maintain consensus over the
status quo would not be enough. Pub-
lic dissatisfaction over falling living stan-
dards produced over fifty dissident groups
during the mid-90s, suggesting that Cuban
citizens were increasingly looking to shape
political and economic processes alterna-
tive to the existing state structure. (Car-
riel, 2011) Faced with a severely flounder-
ing economy and growing popular discon-
tent, the PCC was pressed to begin struc-
turally amending its economic model. Rel-
ative recovery out of the dismal decade has
come on the back of exploiting the coun-
try’s competitive advantage in the tourist
sector, decentralizing certain economic ac-
tivity (notably in food production and dis-
tribution), and allowing market incentives
to spur production. Thus, it is in this pe-
riod that the PCC’s introduction of mar-
ket mechanisms began Cuba’s transition
towards a more mixed economy.
Adding wind to the sails of change, the
day-to-day di culties of the special period
are etched into a new collective memory of
Cuban Millennials who did not live through
the revolution. One Cuban student at Uni-
versity of Havana recounts:
“You couldn’t find meat or dairy any-
where. My mom fried the skin of pa-
payas and put them on rice to help us
pretend. Most of our days were spent
looking for food because government
rations weren’t enough. My friends
and I would look at the Havana pier
everyday, and everyday it was empty.
I just wanted to live better—another
way.” (Chaviano, 2015)
While more substantive ethnographic
work is needed to make conclusive state-
ments, it is worth noting that the many
Cubans of this generation I came into con-
tact with rarely wanted to speak of the
past. My questions about the revolu-
tion—of its heroes, its principles, its short-
comings and successes—were quickly redi-
rected into fervent e↵orts to highlight a
more nuanced Cuba. They were eager to
show the ways in which they are creatively
pushing the envelope in all social spheres
from tech to art. (Helft, 2015) The mes-
sage was clear: there is a burgeoning com-
munity of Cubans who want to be—and are
already—part of a global community whose
ambitions exceed historic limitations on in-
tegration with modernity.
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Moving Forward
The international system of the 21st cen-
tury is characterized by changes in the dis-
tribution of power away from U.S unipo-
lar dominance. It is under revisionist pres-
sures from recognized great power con-
tenders who have organized their politi-
cal economies di↵erently than the plural
democratic, neo-liberal formula historically
propagated by the U.S. The hegemonic pre-
sumption is under attack by rising heavy-
weights like China, India, and Brazil:
abridging sovereignty to impose internal re-
configurations (militarily and economically
by conditioning loans and trade) is becom-
ing a more costly diplomatic move. In
this context, what it means to “liberalize”
and “democratize” is increasingly under-
stood as a nuanced, context-based concept.
This said, the 21st century world remains
favorable to institutionalized, rule-based,
and capitalist modes for organizing polit-
ical economies. The security, diplomatic,
and economic benefits conferred to partic-
ipants and upholders of this order do not
compel radical system overhaul, but incen-
tivize revisionist agendas to operate from
within its bounds. The endurance of liberal
institutional hallmarks—open, rule-based,
and integrated state relations—remain, at
present, enshrined in international insti-
tutions, multilateral diplomacy, and free
trade agreements. Conversation regarding
the merits and drawbacks of such configu-
rations aside, enough states have hopped
on the “rule of law and market mecha-
nisms” bandwagon that it can be dubbed
the “common language.” As such, integra-
tion into the liberal order may vary in pace
and in terms, but the debate about na-
tional choice regarding economic develop-
ment strategies seems to have shifted: it
is increasingly about varieties of capital-
ism. (Hall & Soskice, 2001) It is about dif-
ferent usages of market mechanism to fos-
ter growth and di↵erent ways by which to
engage with global markets rather than “to
be or not to be.”
In light of the trajectory of Cuba’s
reforms, has the country’s “resistance”
to integration into the liberal order only
changed the timeline of its inevitable sub-
mission? Perhaps. This determinism, how-
ever, is not entirely helpful in fashioning
potential Cuban evolutionary trajectories
and the impacts they could have on Cuban
society regarding education, health care,
the spatial and economic bifurcation of so-
ciety, food security, artistic development,
and so on. Although the “Cuba model” of
the Cold War era finds itself outdated, cer-
tain virtuous socialist precedents have been
successfully institutionalized, and many
negative externalities wreaked by the brash
and naive youth of a nascent globaliz-
ing capitalist order have been attenuated
thanks to Cuba’s isolation, or insulation,
from the phenomena. This unique evolu-
tion could enable Cuba’s development into
a highly socialized democracy that uses
market mechanisms for economic develop-
ment in a controlled and equitable fashion.
Still, by neoliberal standards, Cuba’s
embrace of the global economy under Raul
Castro’s leadership since 2006 has been
modest, at best. I will progress with in-
formed speculation: What is the driving
logic behind continued limitation on do-
mestic entrepreneurial activity? How much
longer can the PCC control this activity,
and, as it loses some measure of control,
what will it mean for the authority of the
regime? Will the space created by moder-
ate liberalizations embolden and empower
civil society to make demands for more re-
form? How will the PCC respond to the in-
creasing pressures for inclusion by dissident
interests presenting opposing agendas?
Give them an inch, and they’ll take a mile.
Understanding why the PCC is keeping
careful limits on domestic liberalizations
necessitates exploring both the fallacies
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in a “free-market for optimal social well-
being” logic and the risks entailed by al-
lowing private capital too much freedom,
too soon.
To understand Cuban fears of the free-
market model, one need not look farther
than the e↵ects of private capital in the
country’s northern neighbor. As the U.S.
makes its way into the 21st century, the
American urban landscape is marked by
an unprecedented degree of spatially and
racially concentrated urban poverty devoid
of a significant industrial sector. Urban
poor remain isolated in degrading locales
that have been milked of financial capital,
industry, and jobs that pay a livable wage.
Briefly, this outcome is explained as fol-
lows: Since the onset of the country’s in-
dustrialization, the less that private capital
has been subject to an international and
national regulatory regime and the more
that technological innovations have permit-
ted its rapacious mobility, the relationship
between communities, the private sector,
and the political sector has become increas-
ingly imbalanced. The negotiation pro-
cess over the terms of the relationships be-
tween the aforementioned players has in-
creasingly become one where each comes to
the table with predetermined winning and
losing hands. What’s more, the impact of a
“win” and of a “loss” has become ever more
consequential, and there exists a growing
inequality in who bears the brunt of the
losses and who has access to the wins. Ab-
sent appropriate regulations, market mech-
anisms have largely been utilized to max-
imize profits for the few at the expense of
the public good.
The method behind the outcome: pri-
vate sector mergers. Monopolistic configu-
rations grant business leverage in the eco-
nomic, political, and social realms. As
such, the more that control over produc-
tion and distribution of an industry is con-
solidated under a singular firm, the more
profit the firm can derive. Economically,
less competition in a market means more
leeway to inflate prices and rake in prof-
its above market value, passing on the cost
to consumers. Politically, concentrated pri-
vate control over a vital commodity means
that a firm has substantial economic power
to leverage for political influence: it need
only withhold supply by restricting output
to passively manipulate policy in its favor.
Furthermore, as economic power becomes
more concentrated, the number of impor-
tant decision-makers shrink. This means
that a decision to divest or relocate capi-
tal represents a larger share of the indus-
try and jobs in a community, consequently
a↵ecting a larger share of the residents in
which the industry resides. When labor
becomes dependent on fewer providers of
work, it is put in a subordinated negotiat-
ing position absent alternative employment
options. The power dynamic tilts towards
a dependency of labor on capital, disposing
labor to make more and more concessions
just to keep capital—with their livelihood
in hand—from leaving. From the PCC’s
vantage point, centralizing control over the
means of production has meant avoiding
these dynamics that would impinge on an
equitable and stable distribution of goods
and services.
To understand Cuban fears of liber-
alizing too hastily, we can look broadly
at the struggles that have plagued the
Latin American developmental states sub-
ject to speedy neo-liberal reform packages
in the post-WWII era. Social spending
and human capital investment tended to
su↵er while macro-economic growth was
prioritized. In this structure, it was in
the interest of regional elites to cater
to profit-maximizing needs of private en-
trepreneurs since their own economic and
political power was inextricably bound to
the wealth they amassed or the wealth that
backed them. As such, they did take ex-
treme measures to ease supply and demand
constraints. While some measures were
more benign in nature (supplying credit
to preferred private firms and sectors, pri-
vatizing areas of the public sector, etc.),
they just as often included the suppression
of the masses to create a ready supply of
cheap labor. Such phenomena resulted in
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externally oriented economies that overem-
phasized the export of lucrative monocul-
tures for the consumption of the global core
at the expense of both the production of
food staples for local subsistence and diver-
sified local markets that might root capital
in communities and o↵er labor more ne-
gotiating power. Furthermore, the abrupt
nature of the transition to a radically lib-
eral economic model outpaced the develop-
ment of institutions equipped to manage it,
giving way to a narrow ruling coalition be-
tween profit generators and the represen-
tatives of state muscle capable of ensuring
those profits. There is no natural firewall
between the economy and politics: Those
who have acquired money from the eco-
nomic sector can put this money to work in
the political sector. It follows that a natu-
ral outcome of too intimate a contact over a
prolonged period between the political and
private sector absent institutional bu↵ers is
a realignment of the political ruling coali-
tion to include a domestic capitalist class.
I suspect that the institutionalization
of a state-private sector relationship is ex-
actly what the PCC wants to avoid. The
party is wary of unbottling entrepreneurial
forces with the understanding that once
let out of the cage, they will be very dif-
ficult to re-captivate. An emerging private
sector allows for the private accumulation
of wealth and state-independent ownership
of the country’s means of production. As
such, this sector would not only depend
less and less on the state, but the direction
of dependency would switch: private pro-
duction would become indispensable to the
health of the macro-economy. Leogrande
notes that as this happens, “their desire
for less government interference is certain
to take a more explicitly political direc-
tion.”. (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014) In
other words, a capitalist class will have am-
ple material power to leverage in placing
demands on the government for favorable
business policies that are rarely in line with
equity or distributive justice. Furthermore,
it is likely that demands on the government
by a growing private sector will not stop
at lobbying e↵orts but will escalate into
e↵orts to institutionalize a state-business
alliance to procure preferential treatment
in the long term. If a resilient political
apparatus is not firmly in place to de-
flect this imposition, the socialist fabric of
Cuba’s revolution will be deeply threat-
ened. The prevalence of pro-domestic, pri-
vate business policies without proper regu-
lations will be accompanied by some degree
of inequality, placing redistributive social-
ism on the back burner.
Conclusion
Given that the floodgates have been
opened, the PCC will probably not be able
to keep a cap on the growth of a domes-
tic capitalist class in the long term, nor,
however, will it necessarily want to. Aggre-
gate economic growth, job creation, and el-
evated standards of living generated by do-
mestic entrepreneurial activity aren’t awful
things. The concern may be more a ques-
tion of extent and pace. The pace needs to
be calibrated by the development of Cuban
institutions able to e↵ectively check the in-
equitable logic of capitalism and harness its
growth capacity for the public good. If this
is true, it is likely that the PCC will look to
suppress the growth of a domestic capital-
ist class for enough time to allow current
reforms to the legislative decision making
process to anchor their roots and begin to
work systematically.
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